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INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 
Australia is a federation where the Commonwealth 
has no direct power over crime. What power the 
Commonwealth has in the area of crime derives mainly from 
the operation of the implied incidental power adhering to 
the express powers in section 51 of the Australian 
Constitution and from the express incidental power, 
placitum 51(xxxix). Other constitutional powers, such as 
subsection 52(1), exclusive, plenary power in relation to 
Commonwealth places, section 119. protection of the 
states against domestic violence and section 122, plenary 
power in relation to territories, may be called into play 
in appropriate situations. There is also some role for 
the inherent national power. 
The enactment of the Crimes Act 1914 gave an early 
indication to the States that the Commonwealth did not 
intend to encroach into the criminal law area but rather 
to take a limited and selective role in law enforcement. 
It was not until the 1970's and 1980's that the 
Commonwealth embarked on an increasingly active 
legislation program in response to concerns over the 
Commonwealth's role in the control of organised crime 
which had been exposed as operating in Australia by a 
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succession of inquiries and Royal Commissions commencing 
in 1970 with an Attorney-General's Department Committee 
inquiry into the functions of the Commonwealth Police, 
In 1974 came the Royal Commission into allegations of 
organised crime in licensed clubs in New South Wales, 
with Justice Moffat as Commissioner, followed by the 1980 
Royal Commissions into Drugs (Justices Woodward and 
Williams). The Commonwealth/New South Wales Joint Task 
Force on Drug Trafficking reported in 1983 and from 1983-
1984 Mr Frank Costigan QC led the Royal Commission into 
the Ship Painters and Dockers Union. Other Commissions 
and Inquiries followed, but the Costigan Royal 
Commission, and the activities of the Special Prosecutors 
Office that grew out of the Commission, provided the 
impetus for the Commonwealth's concerted legislative 
onslaught on organised crime. 
In the year following the Costigan Report the then 
Commonwealth Attorney-General, Mr Lionel Bowen, at the 
Seventh United Nations Congress on the Prevention of 
Crime and the Treatment of Offenders in Milan, moved a 
resolution, adopted by the Congress, on organised crime. 
The resolution called upon member states to intensify 
their efforts to combat organised crime more effectively 
at the national level. Specific recommendations were 
measures to: 
(i) introduce new offences directed at novel and 
sophisticated forms of criminal activity; 
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(ii) provide for the forfeiture of illegally 
acquired assets; 
(iii) facilitate the obtaining abroad of evidence 
for use in criminal proceedings in National 
courts; 
(iv) modernise laws relating to_ extradition 
Other recommendations included national drug 
campaigns; strengthening of and increased powers for law 
enforcement authorities; the establishment of a National 
Crime Authority with appropriate powers; review or 
adoption of laws relating to taxation, abuse of bank 
secrecy, and the money laundering potential of gaming 
houses with a view to combating the transfer of funds 
for, or the proceeds of, crime across national 
boundaries; and the development of multilateral and 
bilateral treaties on extradition and mutual legal 
assistance, 
By the end of the next four years there was very 
little, if anything, of that program which the 
Commonwealth had not put into legislative effect. 
Organised Crime Issues 
Costigan, confronting the issues which he saw 
arising out of the Royal Commission into the Ship 
Painters and Dockers Union, and which continue to raise 
3 
strong emotions on both sides of the argument, asked, 
'Can a free Society cope efficiently with the impact of 
organised crime and still remain free?' 1 • He states the 
problem graphically and succinctly: 
What this debate is all about is an attempt to 
define the acceptable balance which this 
country, as a civilised community, is prepared 
to strike. Neither extreme is acceptable. On 
the other hand, if nothing is done about the 
current problem, within five years this country 
will have become a jungle. The wild animals 
will not bite everybody, but their presence 
will be known and feared. At the other 
extreme, Draconian powers could be given to 
such a body, such as search and seizure without 
warrant and arrest and confinement without 
charge. 
Costigan and his Counsel Assisting in the Painters 
and Dockers Royal Commission, Mr Douglas Meagher, QC, 
have been called "the moral entrepreneurs of organized 
crime" 2 • To justify the kinds of powers to be vested in 
an investigatory body , which both recommended3 , it was 
necessary for people to believe that organised crime 
existed and that it posed a real threat. Costigan 
described a common reaction in the community to the idea 
of organised crime in 1984 as a reaction of disbelief 
1 Costigan, F QC. "Organised Crime and a Free 
Society" (1984) 17 Australian and New Zealand Journal 
of Criminology t7, 8, 
2
.Freiberg, A. "Ripples from the Bottom of the 
Harbour: Some social Ramifications of Taxation Fraud" 
(1988) 12 Criminal Law Journal 136, at 52. 
3
. Costigan, F QC. "Organised Crime and a Free 
Society" (1984) 17 Australian and New Zealand Journal 
of Criminology 7, at 13-14. Meagher, D QC. "Organised 
Crime" Papers presented to the 53rd ANZAAS Congress, 
Perth, WA 16-20 May 1983, Part IV. 
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that the problem existed or was serious, and he, too, 
confessed that in spite of 25 years at the Bar he, 
himself, had had no idea of what he was to find. 4 
Much has been written on the definition, or lack of 
definition, of organised crime· 5 The commonly held view 
is that it involves a centrally organised, hierarchical, 
power seeking entity having reasonably stable structures 
with continuing activities, and involving corruption and 
violence or the fear of violence, 
In Australia no rigid, stable, hierarchical 
organisational structure appears to have emerged in any 
of the Royal Commissions previously mentioned6 • However, 
when confronted with the failure of the Commonwealth 
Police to find any "Mr Big" in 1979, Williams J, Drugs 
Royal Commissioner, is credited with saying that there 
were "plenty of Mr Big Enoughs" 7 , and that appears to 
4 Ibid, 7-8. 
5 Bynum, Ts. (ed). "Organised Crime in America: 
concepts and controversies" Crim. Justice Press NY 1987; 
Bersten, M. "Defining Organised Crime in Australia and 
the USA" (1990) 23 Australian and New Zealand Journal 
of Criminology 39. 
6 See Meagher, D QC. 
presented to the 53rd ANZAAS 
May 1983, at 20; Wardlaw, G. 
Enforcement" 16 at 18. 
"Organised Crime" Papers 
Congress, Perth, WA 16-20 
"Organised Crime and Drug 
7 Bersten, M. "Defining Organised Crime in 
Australia and the USA" (1990) 23 Australian and New 
Zealand Journal of Criminology 39, 52; cf "The National 
Crime Authority - An Initial Evaluation" Report of the 
Parliamentary Joint Committee on the National Crime 
Authority 1988. paragraphs 2.19-2.20 •• 
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have been a common experience of investigators. All are 
firmly of the view that a significant proportion of 
commercial crime, tax fraud, and corruption of government 
officials, law enforcement agencies, politicians and 
financial institutions is perpetrated by organised crime 
groups• 8 
The Commonwealth Response 
Taxation Aspects 
The Commonwealth's initial response to disclosures 
of large-scale and organised tax evasion by the Costigan 
and McCabe/La Franchi Inquiries, such as the "bottom-of-
the-harbour" schemes, was to embark on a campaign of 
recovery. Estimates of the cost of tax evasion to the 
revenue during the 70s vary from $3,000 million to $7,000 
million per year9 , with a large tax-avoidance industry 
gaining assistance from the decisions of the Barwick High 
Court, such as Mullens v The Federal Commissioner of 
Taxation10 , Sl11tzkin v The Federal Commissioner of 
8 Costigan, F QC. "Organised Crime and 
Society• (1984) 17 Australian and New Zealand 
of Criminology 7, at 11. 
a Free 
Journal 
9 Grbicb, Y 
Australia" in Head, 
(1983) at 413. 
F R. •Problems of Tax Avoidance in 
JG (ed) Taxation Issues of the 80s 
10 (1976) 76 Australian Tax Cases 4288. 
6 
Taxatjon11 and Cridland v The Federal Commissioner of 
Taxation12 . 
The McCabe/La Franchi Inquiry had been highly 
critical of the Taxation Department, the banking system 
and the Government. It criticised the failure of the 
Taxation Office to take action when it clearly had the 
grounds to do so, the failure of the Government to 
curtail the freedom of dealers to off er discount rates on 
the purchase of companies and to pay commissions to 
accountants and solicitors who referred vendors, and the 
general willingness of the whole community to participate 
in tax avoidance 1 3. 
The Crimes (Taxation Offences) Act 1980 was the 
commonwealth's first significant legislative attempt to 
make tax evasion a serious criminal offence. 
Section 6 of that Act, together with sections 5 and 
6 of the Crimes Act 1914 and section 8Y of the Taxation 
Admjnistration Act 1953, operates to bring the criminal 
law to bear on professional advisers who were directly or 
indirectly involved in the planning or implementation of 
any scheme. According to Arie Freiberg, the Act is 
credited with the sudden halt of the bottom-of-the-
11 (1977) 77 Australian Tax Cases 4076. 
12 (1977) 77 Australian Tax Cases 4538. 
13 Freiberg, A. "Ripples from 
Harbour: Some Social Ramifications of 
(1988) 12 Crimjnal Law Journal 136, 
the Bottom of the 
Taxation Fraud" 
143. 
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harbour schemes, though there have been few convictions 
under the Act14 
In 1982 the 'TUCT legislation' (Taxation !Unpaid 
Company Tax) Assessment Act 1982 and associated 
legislation directed at vendors and promotors) was 
enacted to recover the unpaid company tax and 
undistributed profits tax from the vendor shareholders of 
companies stripped in bottom-of-the-harbour schemes. The 
legislation imposed a tax liability on the vendors of a 
company's assets so as to render it unable to meet its 
current or future tax liabilities. It was explicitly 
retroactive, authorising recovery of tax from schemes 
that were entered into prior to the 1980 enactment. 
In McCormick v Federal Commissioner of Taxation15 
it was argued that the legislation was not a law imposing 
taxation within placitum 51(ii) of the constitution, 
since it purported to impose a liability, amounting to an 
acquisition of property other than on just terms within 
placitum 51(xxxi), on persons having no relevant 
connection with the legal person, the company, having the 
unpaid tax liability, 
The High Court upheld the law as a law with respect 
to taxation, characterising the tax as 'a tax upon a 
transaction which resulted in a company being stripped of 
14 
15 
Ibid, 160. 
(1984) 84 ATC 4230. 
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its assets so as to be unable to pay company tax• 16 and 
held that the plaintiffs' 'sufficient connection' was 
their status as persons who benefited directly or 
indirectly from the transaction. 
As regards the placitum 51(xxxi) submission, the 
High Court dismissed the argument by reference to ~ 
Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Clyne17 where it was 
said that once a tax is authorised by placitum 51(ii) it 
is an absurdity to claim that the relevant amount 
constitutes property acquired under placitum 51(xxxi). 
Qrganised Crime 
Assuming a belief in the existence of organised 
crime in Australia, the question arises of whether the 
Commonwealth has a legitimate role in the control of 
organised crime and the extent to which it can and 
should respond to that threat. 
The framers of the Constitution left general crime 
control as the province of the states. The Commonwealth 
role was seen as relating to the enforcement of its own 
laws in the specified areas conferred on it by the 
Constitution, often by means of investigative units 
within Departments of State, 
16 
17 
Ibid, 4235. 
(1958-1959) 100 CLR 246, 263. 
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The Deyelopment of Commonwealth Law Enforcement 
From the time of Federation the Commonwealth 
adopted an ad hoc and piecemeal approach to law 
enforcement, and the various early attempts to create a 
Commonwealth police force failed for want of a clear 
role; their activities were restricted to minor 
investigations and guarding, The impetus towards the 
development of a police force with a particular role in 
enforcing Commonwealth law and protecting Commonwealth 
interests resulted from tensions and difficulties in 
Commonwealth/State relations concerning priorities and 
even enforcement. 
The Commonwealth Police Act was proclaimed in 1960 
following five years of dissension, fears that the new 
force would encroach on the duties of State police, and 
opposition from Departments with investigative staff 
fighting strongly to preserve their independence. The 
new force still suffered from a lack of consensus 
concerning its desirable role. It was excluded from 
narcotics law enforcement and the establishment of the 
Narcotics Bureau in 1968 as a separate agency within 
Customs suggests that the Commonwealth saw no need at 
that time to consolidate its investigative forces in one 
organisation. 
The lack of a clear conception of the force's role 
meant a failure to provide an adequate foundation for its 
development, with the consequence that the Commonwealth 
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law enforcement system was poorly equipped to meet the 
challenges of the 1970s. 
Efforts to define a clearer and more positive role 
for the Commonwealth police had always fallen foul of 
entrenched interests, either in the states or in 
investigatory units within Departments. Finally, its 
development rested on the identification of previously 
undeveloped areas of law enforcement, free from 
challenging competitors. 
In 1967 the National Committee on Drugs of 
Dependence resolved that the Central Crime Intelligence 
Bureau of the Commonwealth Police should be extended to 
include the gathering of national drug intelligence, 
From 1970 to 1972 a committee within the Attorney-
General 's department examined the functions of the 
police. It identified organised crime as an emerging and 
major threat to the national interest and recommended 
that the Commonwealth Police be given the authority to 
collect intelligence not only on narcotics and crimes 
which were specifically the responsibility of the 
Commonwealth, but on the general activities of overseas 
criminal groups in Australia. 
Following the election of the new Labor Government 
in 19"73, Mr Kerry Mil te, a former member of the 
Commonwealth Police, was asked to evaluate the efficiency 
and functions of the force. He endorsed its further 
expansion into the organised crime area on the ground 
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that there was almost no aspect of organised crime 
that did not involve a breach of Commonwealth law. He 
recommended the establishment of overseas liaison posts 
as sources of criminal intelligence in countries having 
direct criminal links with Australia, and the assumption 
of the operation of the liaison bureau with Interpol from 
the Victoria Police. 
By 1975 the States were protesting to the 
Commonwealth Government that these activities, although 
they were only intelligence gathering, were encroaching 
upon areas {such as the operation of massage parlours) 
which, in their view, involved state offences only. 
Later revelations of police corruption in Queensland and 
New South Wales may have some bearing on this 
discouragement of Commonwealth involvement. At this time 
the Commonwealth police did not have a charter to 
investigate to prosecution stage organised criminal 
activities and could do little if the intelligence they 
collected and disseminated to the States was not pursued 
in the appropriate jurisdiction. 
The real shock of the findings of the Royal 
Commissions and Inquiries in the 70s and 80s was the 
extent to which organised crime had achieved superiority 
over a fragmented, uncoordinated and unco-operative law 
enforcement machinery. 
In 1979 the Australian Federal Police Act came into 
operation, amalgamating the Commonwealth Police and the 
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Australian Capital Territory Police, giving the new force 
a co-ordinating role in the efforts of all police forces 
against interstate crime, and conferring on it the 
functions of the now disbanded Narcotics Bureau. From 
the beginning the investigative role of the new force was 
stretched by the demands of the operations of the Royal 
Commissions, the Special Prosecutors that rose out of 
them, and the joint task forces working to reduce the 
level of comfort in the environment for organised and 
white collar criminals and drug traffickers18, 
The Commonwealth had acquired a police force with a 
clearer and developing role, but many of the problems 
resulting from the federal system and competing interests 
within the Commonwealth itself remained. In 1981 Justice 
Woodward still wrote scathingly of the effects of rivalry 
and competition on effective law enforcement: 
There is lacking throughout Australia 
adequately organised cooperation between State 
and Federal agencies. Such cooperation should 
be extended to include intelligence, objectives 
directed at individuals, field investigations 
and prosecutions 
In the past there has been wasteful competitiveness 
between law enforcement agencies who are supposed to 
be working in the same cause. Citizens of this 
country should not be requirey9to bear the cost of counter-productive rivalries. 
18 Historical information from Law Enforcement 
Policy and Resources Committee Officers' Report 1988, 
Appendix A. 
19 Woodward, P M. "Organisational Crime and the 
difficulties of Law Enforcement" (1981) ACPC Forum vol 
4 No 2 16, 25. 
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The I,egislatiye Initiative against Organised Crime 
When, in 1965, the Australian delegation to the 3rd 
UN Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment 
of Offenders was asked to report on the need to establish 
an Institute of Criminology, a threshhold question for 
Cabinet was whether this was a proper area for the 
Commonwealth to enter. The affirmative conclusion was 
based on the increasing incidence of crime, creating a 
national problem that required examination at a national 
level; organised crime extending beyond the boundaries of 
individual States; the international aspects of organised 
crime, and the Commonwealth interest in customs, 
immigration, alien control and deportation, taxation and 
currency. 
However it was not until the mid-80s that the 
Commonwealth began to work on a legislative package 
specifically geared towards the suppression of organised 
crime, 
The package was preceded by the establishment of 
the Commonwealth Office of the Director of Public 
Prosecutions in 1980 and the National Crime Authority in 
1984. The former eliminated the problem of competing 
with State priorities for prosecution of Commonwealth 
offences, provided for the development of a specialist 
corps of lawyers expert in Commonwealth criminal law, 
provided the machinery for civil remedies which were to 
become an integral part of the Commonwealth's armoury in 
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combating organised crime, and removed the decision to 
prosecute from the political arena. Although section 8 
of the Director of Public Prosecutions Act 1980 gives the 
Attorney-General power to issue directives and guidelines 
to the Director, only one such direction has been issued 
since the establishment of the Office, and this, with the 
agreement of the Director, was to the effect that the 
Office should provide material to a Parliamentary 
Commission of Inquiry and had no bearing on the 
prosecution process. 
The National Crime Authority Act 1984 with its 
underpinning State legislation embodies the recognition 
that major organised crime requires a qualitatively and 
quantitatively different response to that traditionally 
provided by the police forces, and that such a response 
must involve close co-operation between the Commonwealth 
and the States at both policy and operational levels. It 
reflected the need for multi-disciplinary expertise and 
special systems, including computers, to analyse complex 
material, the need for Royal Commission types of powers 
and for access to taxation information. 
In 1987 a process of legislation commenced aimed at 
facilitating the investigation and prosecution of 
organised crime and at reducing its profitability and 
increasing its risks. In broad overview the package 
comprises: 
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(a) the Telecommunjcatjons (Interception) Amendment Act 
1Jl..8.1, which assists law enforcement agencies in 
dealing with specific areas of criminal activity and 
with organised crime by providing wider avenues of 
telecommunications interception, Provision is made 
for two classes of offences: 
(i} murder, kidnapping, serious narcotics offences 
and offences in relation to which the National 
Crime Authority is conducting a special 
investigation. Before a warrant can be issued 
in these cases, a judge must be satisfied on a 
number of issues, including the extent to which 
other investigatory measures have been taken, 
and their efficacy; 
(ii) offences punishable by imprisonment for life or 
a maximum period of seven years or longer which 
involve loss of life or serious personal injury 
or risk of such loss or injury, serious damage 
to property in circumstances endangering a 
person's safety, trafficking in narcotic drugs, 
serious fraud or serious revenue offences. Jn 
considering whether to issue a warrant in these 
cases a judge must be satisfied on issues 
including other investigative measures taken 
and their efficacy, the extent of interference 
with personal privacy and the gravity of the 
conduct being investigated. 
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Interception is undertaken by the Australian Federal 
Police and the legislation includes a number of 
provisions designed to ensure adequate oversight of 
the operations of the Australian Federal Police and 
the National Crime Authority, Copies of all 
warrants must be furnished to the Minister; reports 
must be provided to the Minister in relation to the 
use of information obtained under warrants and an 
annual Report is provided to Parliament by the 
Minister, The legislation provides for inspection 
by the Ombudsman of the records of the Australian 
Federal Police and the National Crime Authority to 
ascertain compliance with the legislation. Controls 
are provided in relation to the use and 
communication of information obtained by means of 
telecommunications interception, It is an offence 
to possess, communicate or record unlawfully 
intercepted information and unlawfully intercepted 
information may be admissible only for the purposes 
of establishing a contravention of the legislation, 
which also sets out the specific purposes for which 
lawfully intercepted information may be used in 
evidence. 
(b) the Proceeds of Crime Act 1987 strikes at major 
organised crime by depriving those involved in it of 
the profits and instruments of their crime. The 
objective is to suppress criminal activity by 
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attacking the primary motive, profit, and by 
preventing the reinvestment of profit in further 
criminal activity, The Act supplements earlier 
provisions introduced in the Customs Act 1901 
empowering a court to make an order for a pecuniary 
penalty based on the value of the benefits derived 
from narcotics dealings. 
Freezing and confiscation orders permit a court to 
grant orders for the freezing and confiscation of 
property used in, or derived directly or indirectly 
from, the commission of an indictable offence 
against Commonwealth law. In addition the 
legislation provides for the enforcement of foreign 
freezing and confiscation orders which relate to 
property in Australia where relevant procedures 
under the Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act 
lJl.B.1. have been complied with. 
Confiscation orders may take the form of either 
forfeiture orders or orders for pecuniary penalties, 
or, if appropriate, a combination of both. Third 
parties having an interest in the property who can 
establish that they were not in any way involved in 
the commission of the offence may seek exemption 
from the forfeiture orders. The process laid down 
for pecuniary penalties involves an assessment of 
the benefit which the offender derived, directly or 
indirectly from the commission of the offence, the 
assignment of a monetary value to that benefit and 
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the making of a pecuniary penalty order to the value 
of that amount. The order is enforceable as a civil 
debt and is provable in bankruptcy; the courts are 
empowered to look behind the legal ownership of 
property to determine whether it is subject to the 
effective control of the defendant. 
The legislation provides for statutory forfeiture in 
the case of a serious offence (defined to include a 
narcotics offence involving a trafficable quantity 
of drugs, an organised fraud offence or an offence 
of money-laundering the proceeds of either of those 
offences). In such a case the offender is liable to 
have all property which is the subject of a 
restraining order under the legislation forfeited by 
force of statute, unless the person can establish 
that the property was lawfully acquired. 
Restraining orders are available where persons may 
seek to move property out of the ,jurisdiction on 
becoming aware that charges may be laid and powers 
are conferred on police to sei7-e property reasonably 
believed to be tainted pending the making of a 
restraining order. 
Wide powers directed at following the money trail 
and the transferring of tainted property are 
conferred on law enforcement officers by the 
legislation: the court may make orders for the 
production of property tracking documents to a law 
19 
enforcement officer, issue search warrants 
authorising the seizure of such documents, make 
monitoring orders in relation to serious offences 
which require financial institutions to provide 
information over specified periods of time 
concerning transactions conducted through the 
accounts of a particular person. Financial 
institutions are subject to a statutory obligation 
to retain certain records to assist the following of 
the money trail. 
Two new offences are created: money laundering, 
where a person knows or ought reasonably to have 
known that property is the proceeds of crime, being 
an indictable offence against a federal law or a 
drug trafficking offence committed overseas which 
would have constituted an offence if committed in 
Australia, and organised fraud constituted by acts 
and omissions constituting three or more public 
~ 
fraud offences from which the person has derived 
substantial benefit. 
(c) The Cash Transactjon Reports Act 1988 complements 
the proceeds of crime legislation, and is directed 
at facilitating the following of the money trail for 
proceeds of all criminal activity, including tax 
evasion, and the detection of financiers of criminal 
activity such as drug trafficking. 
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The legislation enables law enforcement agencies to 
monitor the movements of large amounts of cash, and 
to identify tax evaders and the recipients of 
proceeds of crime. Transactions reportable to the 
Cash Transaction Reports Agency include large-scale 
cash transactions, any suspect transactions, the 
export of foreign currency and the import of foreign 
and Australian currency over a prescribed level. 
Cash dealers, including financial institutions and 
others, such as bookmakers and casinos, are required 
to report details of any transactions which the 
dealer suspects may be relevant to offences against 
federal laws, and cash transactions to which they 
are a party, other than transactions exempt in the 
manner prescribed by the legislation, which involve 
currency in excess of $10,000. 
These provisions are supplemented by a requirement 
for the verification of the identity of account 
holders who open new accounts or whose accounts 
exceed a prescribed limit. It is an offence to open 
an account in a false name, the proliferation of 
such accounts having been identified by the National 
Crime Authority as a major impediment to the 
detection and prosecution of organised crime. 
(d) The Extradition Act 1988 consists of an exhaustive 
review and consolidation of previous extradition 
laws and introduces improvements which enable 
Australia to enter into extradition treaties on a 
21 
wider basis, the provisions of most relevance to 
organised crime, and incorporate a number of human 
rights safeguards. The legislation allows Australia 
to prosecute Australian citizens for offences 
committed in another country in cases where 
extradition from that country of its nationals would 
be refused on the basis of citizenship, remedying an 
unequal application of treaty obligations as far as 
Australia is concerned. The law is also simplified 
in relation to the determination of dual criminality 
and the satisfaction of the committal to trial test. 
Major drug rings can be handled more efficiently by 
the provisions for temporary surrender, enabling a 
prisoner to stand trial in another country and then 
be returned to serve his or her sentence, since 
cases involving more than one accused are often 
better conducted concurrently. 
The legislation also attempts to impose limits on 
the political offence exception by excluding from 
the exception crimes recognised by the international 
community in multilateral treaties as extremely 
serious, such as those relating to hijacking, safety 
of aircraft, taking of hostages and so on. 
(e) The Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act 1987 
is important in combating organised crime, providing 
the basis for Australia to enter into arrangements 
22 
with other countries to request and grant assistance 
relating to the investigation and prosecution of 
crime and to the forfeiture of the proceeds of crime 
in areas such as: the obtaining (and provision) of 
documents, records and other articles of evidence, 
the execution of requests for search and seizure, 
the making of arrangements for persons to give 
evidence or assist in investigation, the location 
and identification of witnesses or suspects, the 
forfeiture or confiscation of property in relation 
to offences, the recovery of pecuniary penalties, 
the restraining of dealings in property and the 
freezing of assets that may be forfeited or needed 
to satisfy pecuniary penalty orders, the location of 
property and the service of documents. 
It provides machinery for the taking of evidence and 
the production of documents for transmission to a 
foreign country for use in court proceedings, for 
search and seizure at the request of foreign 
countries where the penalty for the relevant offence 
is at least twelve months, mutual arrangements for 
travel between Australia and foreign countries for 
persons to give evidence or assist in 
investigations. Safeguards against injustice or 
oppression to individuals are included. The 
legislation also provides the machinery for making 
the provisions of the Proceeds of Crime Act 
available to foreign applicants. 
23 
(f) The Crimes (Superannuation Benefits) Act 1989 is a 
response to the finding of all the relevant Royal 
Commissions and inquiries that official corruption 
is an inevitable component of organised crime. The 
legislation is designed to prevent the payment of 
Commonwealth funded superannuation benefits where a 
Commonwealth employee has been convicted of a 
corruption offence; to allow the recovery of such 
payments where the person has already received 
Commonwealth funded superannuation benefits and has 
subsequently been convicted of a corruption offence 
which occurred when the person was a Commonwealth 
employee; and to restrain property of a Commonwealth 
employee convicted, or who may be convicted, of a 
corruption offence where that person has been paid a 
Commonwealth funded superannuation benefit. Where 
an order is made making a person's property 
available to satisfy a recovery order the court may 
look behind legal ownership to determine whether the 
person has effective control of the property, and 
may lift the corporate veil. 
The employee's contribution, including interest on 
that sum, is not forfeitable and is to be refunded 
under the legislation. 
A corruption offence is an offence committed by a 
Commonwealth employee involving abuse of office, 
committed for a purpose that involved corruption or 
committed for the purpose of perverting or 
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attempting to pervert the course of justice. 
Applications for superannuation orders are confined 
to cases where the actual sentence on conviction 
exceeds twelve months, so that benefits are not 
forfeited for minor infringements, (special 
provision is made for the case of the absconder). 
The legislation directs the court to take no account 
at the time of sentencing of the possibility that a 
superannuation order may be made in relation to a 
person. The principle involved is that corruption 
is viewed as a failure to fulfil a condition of 
Commonwealth employment, that is, that duties be 
discharged in a non-corrupt way, and it is that 
failure which leads to the disentitlement to 
superannuation benefits. The legislation does not 
seek to create an additional penalty for the conduct 
constituting the offence and the courts are 
precluded from taking the legislation into account 
when imposing a penalty or sentence for an 
offence. 20 
Similar provisions in relation to the Australian 
Federal Police were effected by amendments to the 
Australjan Federal Police Act 1979 in the Autumn 
Sittings of 1989. 
20 Explanatory Memorandum. 
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Having taken an overview of the Commonwealth's 
legislative response to organised crime, the question 
arises of whether Costigan's question "Can a free society 
cope effectively with organised crime and still remain 
free? 1121may be answered in the affirmative, or has the 
Commonwealth engaged in what Brent Fisse has called 
"Draconian overreach1122? An attempt to answer these 
questions will be made after a closer consideration of 
the legislation and measures taken by the Commonwealth 
to safeguard civil liberties. 
There are, however, two dangers of which policy-
makers need to be aware in seeking a legislative solution 
to crime: 
the legislation may have unintended consequences 
(see section on the proposed Australia Card at p 
xxx) which result in adverse effects that may 
outweigh the intended benefits; and 
the legislation may create more criminals than it 
disposes of, in the sense that newly created 
offences related to the prevention or regulatory 
control of crime result in more convictions than the 
original criminal behaviour. 
21 Costigan, F QC. "Organised Crime and a Free 
Society" ( 1984) 17 Australian and New Zeal and Journal 
of Criminology 7, 8. 
22 Fisse, B. " Draconian Overreach in Organised 
Crime Control: The Real dirt in Money-Laundering" 
( 1987) 25 J,aw Society Journal of New south Wales 60. 
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The Parliamentary Joint Committee on the National 
Crime Authority considered that the policy of prohibition 
in relation to drugs has been responsible for an erosion 
of generally accepted civil liberties, for example, 
police raids by heavily armed police in search of non-
existent drugs, road-block for random search of passing 
vehicles, intrusive search of persons on suspicion, 
damage to reputation on the basis of suspicion, reversal 
of onus of proof regarding quantities deemed evidence of 
intent to traffic, and also that enforcement 
discriminates against the young and the poor23 • 
The over-criminalisation of drug use, apart from 
possessing and trafficking offences, generates other 
criminal activity which would not exist in the absence of 
the prohibition, for example, murders, assaults, 
robberies associated with drug transactions, bribery and 
corruption, contravention of financial regulations and 
currency laws, and tax evasion24 • 
23 
"The National Crime Authority - An Initial 
Evaluation" Report of the Parliamentary Joint Committee 
on the National Crime Authority 1988, Paragraphs 5,23-
5, 24. 
24 Wardlaw, G, "Organised Crime and Drug 
Enforcement" Reporter 7 (2) June 1986 11 at p 21. 
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THE CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK AS A DETERMINANT OF 
THE COMMONWEALTH RESPONSE 
The fact that the Commonwealth had little 
substantive power to legislate on the subject matter of 
crime, coupled with the indifference of organised crime 
to state or national jurisdictional boundaries, meant 
that the Commonwealth needed to be creative in its 
approach to legislative control of the phenomenon of 
organised crime. 
Following the discovery from the findings of the 
various Royal Commissions that Australia provided a very 
comfortable operating environment for organised crime, 
policies developed aimed not at the substantive crimes 
themselves so much as at reducing the level of comfort of 
the environment by making organised criminal activity 
"more difficult, more costly and more risky" 25 and by 
deterring new players from entering the field. 
The methods which the Commonwealth decided to use 
to bring this about were inspired by those developed by 
Costigan QC in the Royal commission into the Ship 
Painters and Dockers Union, employing the special powers 
provided by the Royal Commissions Act 1902 and making 
extensive use of computer analysis. Costigan followed 
the money trail to trace criminal networks and to 
identify the directing mind and will behind criminal 
25 
"The National Crime Authority - An Initial 
Evaluation" Report of the Parliamentary Joint Committee 
on the National Crime Authority 1988, at paragraph 4.26, 
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operations, people sufficiently removed from the level of 
street crime to escape detection by the normal methods 
and expertise available to police. This involved 
following traceable transactions recorded in public or 
private documents or on computer tape, He made use of 
the existing facilities of the community, the banking 
system, solicitors' trust accounts, building societies 
and merchant banks, to trace moneys transmitted overseas, 
property bought and sold, shares acquired, investments 
made, credit cards used, joint ventures entered into, 
passports applied for, immigration cards filled out at 
every point of entry and exit, telephone calls made, and 
hotel bills paid26, 
With the means to identify the people involved in 
and enriched by organised crime there came the need to 
find means to prosecute, convict and punish them and to 
deprive them of the accrued benefits of their involvement 
in organised crime. 
Many major crimes likely to be committed by members 
of criminal organisations are already Commonwealth 
offences: importing, or trafficking in imported, 
proscribed substances, many major fraud and revenue 
offences, offences relating to the administration of 
justice in the Commonwealth sphere, bribery and 
corruption of Commonwealth officers, conspiracy and 
26 Costigan, F QC. "Organised Crime and a Free 
Society" ( 1984) 17 Australian and New Zealand Journal 
of Crimjnolo~y 7, 12-13. 
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inchoate and secondary offences associated with 
substantive offences. Many offences having national or 
international ramifications also frequently have aspects 
which bring them within Commonwealth jurisdiction. 
The Commonwealth has not yet tested how far it can 
extend the express incidental power of placitum 51(xxxix) 
of the Constitution, the main source of power for general 
Commonwealth law enforcement legislation. 
Placitum 51(xxxix) confers power on the 
Commonwealth to make laws with respect to matters 
incidental to the execution of any power vested by the 
Constitution in the Parliament, or either House of the 
Parliament, or in the Government of the Commonwealth, or 
in the Federal Judicature or in any department or officer 
of the Commonwealth. 
It has not been clear how this express incidental 
power differs from the implied incidental power which 
adheres to each of the express powers and gives authority 
to legislate in relation to anything the control of which 
is found necessary to effectuate its main purpose27 • 
The accepted view is that the implied incidental 
power goes to matters incidental to the subject matter of 
each express power, while the express incidental power 
goes to matters incidental to particular exercises of 
27 Grannall v Marrickyjlle Margarine Pty Ltd 
(1955) 93 CLR 55, 77. 
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legislative power28 • Gibbs CJ in Gazzo v Comptroller of 
Stamps IYicl: ex parte Attorney-General for Yictoria29 
commented that it was not at all clear what s 51(xxxix) 
added in its application to matters incidental to the 
execution of legislative power to the implied incidental 
content of each power. In the same case Aickin J said 
that s 51(xxxix) "cannot be used to expand the subject-
matter of any of the enumerated legislative powers" 30, 
Gary Rumble 31 takes issue with the statement of 
Aickin J and suggests "a line of reasoning based on the 
distinction between section 51(xxxix) and the implied 
incidental power which would find in section 51(xxxix) a 
large potential for Commonwealth action", 
Rumble gives as an example of laws relevant to a 
particular execution of a legislative power which would 
not also he charactisable as relevant to the subject 
matter of the legislative power the general provisions in 
Part lA of the Crimes Act 1914 which, on their face, have 
no connection with any particular subject matter of 
Commonwealth power and are valid because of, and only 
28 J,e Mes11rier v Connor (1929) 42 CLR 481, 497-
498. 
29 (1981) 38 ALR 25, 31. 
30 Ibid, 56, 
31 
"Section 51(xxxix) of the Constitution and 
Federal Distribution of Power" ( 1982) 13 Federal I.aw 
Review 182, 183. 
the 
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because of, their relevance to exercises of Commonwealth 
power 32 • 
Having drawn attention to this distinction between 
the express and implied incidental powers, Rumble 
proceeds to examine the possible interaction of section 
51(xxxix) with the principle established by Herald & 
Weekly Times Ltd v Commonwealth 33 and Murphyores 
Incorporated Pty Ltd v Commonwealth34 • The former case 
established that the Commonwealth could prohibit an 
activity at the centre of a power absolutely and any 
relaxation of the prohibition was similarly a law with 
respect to the subject matter of the prohibition, with no 
requirement that either the prohibition or the relaxation 
of the prohibition be further connected with Commonwealth 
power by being conditioned on criteria within 
Commonwealth power35, In the Murphyores Case it was held 
that it was within the Commonwealth's power under section 
51(i) to prohibit (and allow) export by reference to non-
Commonwealth considerations 36 • 
32 Ibid, 184. 
33 (1966) 115 CLR 418. 
34 (1976) 136 CLR 1. 
35 (1966) 115 CLR 418, 433-434, per Kitto J; 
Taylor, Windeyer and Owen JJ concurring, 439-440, per 
Menzies J 
36 (1976) 136 CLR 1, 8 per McTiernan J, 11-12 per 
Stephen J, 22-23 per Mason J. Barwick CJ endorsed the 
judgment of Stephen J, at 5; Gibbs J, at 9, and Jacobs J, 
at 26, endorsed the judgments of Stephen and Mason JJ. 
32 
On the assumption that these principles apply 
equally to the placita in section 51, section 51(xxxix) 
would support action to enforce valid Commonwealth laws 
which utilised them. In Rumbles's example: 
Thus should the Commonwealth, in reliance on 
its powers under s 51(i) or s 51(v) or s 
51(xiii) or s 51(xiv), prohibit export or 
broadcasting or banking or insurance by 
reference to employment conditions or 
intrastate trade or environmental impact or 
attitude to women, then it may generate through 
s 51(xxxix) a power to legislate directly to 
control the exporter's or broadcaster's or 
banker's or insurer's behaviour in relation to 
those non-Commonwealth subject matters. 
According to the established distinction 
between the implied and express incidental 
power, a measure based on s 51(xxxix) need only 
have reference to the execution of a 
Commonwealth power and need not have any 
relevance to the su~iect matter of a 
Commonwealth power. 
Rumble identifies one category of condition which 
would always justify Commonwealth legislation directly 
requiring performance of the condition, although it may 
have no relation to a Commonwealth head of power. This 
is the situation where the Commonwealth provides that a 
prohibition on engaging in an activity should be relaxed 
on a condition relating to the behaviour of the person 
admitted to the Commonwealth controlled activity after he 
had completed his participation in the activity. 
Commonwealth enforcement of the condition would 
37 Rumble, GA. "Section 51(xxxix) of the 
Constitution and the Federal Distribution of Power" 
(1982) 13 Federal !,aw Reylew 182, 185-186. 
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necessarily involve control of the subject matter of the 
condition38 , 
Although Rumble has identified a source of power 
which the Commonwealth has not yet exploited, it is 
nevertheless not possible, due to the constitutional 
limitations, for the Commonwealth to cover the field in 
respect of offences relevant to the control of organised 
crime. 
Woodward J 39 advocated a unitary, cooperative 
approach to the organised crime problem, and so, too, did 
Costigan, who enumerated the characteristics of organised 
crime which required such an approach: that it is 
widespread and organised, separate from street crime but 
having links with it, that it is impossible to 
investigate in one state or territory, that it has links 
with overseas organisations and facilities, that it is a 
major industry with a turnover in billions of dollars per 
year, that it employs sophisticated techniques involving 
breaches of many laws relating to companies, taxation, 
foreign exchange, immigration and so on, designed to keep 
secret the identities and procedures involved and that it 
38 Ibid, 186. 
39 Woodward, P M. "Organisational Crime and the 
difficulties of Law Enforcement" (1981) ACPC Forum vol 
4 No 2 16, 25. 
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involves incredibly complex chains of transactions to 
frustrate attempts at investigation40 • 
The National Crime Authority: An Exercise in Cooperative 
Federalism 
The best solution to the constitutional and 
jurisdictional difficulties inherent in the federal 
system was considered to be the establishment of a co-
operative scheme. Therefore, while the revelations of 
the Costigan Report on the Royal Commission into the Ship 
Painters and Dockers Union were still a strong motivating 
factor, an exercise in State/Commonwealth co-operation 
created in 1984, not without difficulty, the National 
Crime authority to inherit the databases and methods of 
operation of the Royal Commission and to carry on its 
efforts in combating complex organised crime. Its first 
Chairman was Mr Justice Stewart with recent significant 
experience in the area of organised crime as Royal 
Commissioner inquiring into Drugs (Mr Asia) in 1983 and 
the Nugan Hand Bank (1983-1984). 
Controversy surrounded the creation of the National 
Crime Authority, with civil libertarians opposed to the 
extensive powers provided by the legislation, which were 
perceived as a threat to the rights of individuals when 
vested in a permanent body rather than a temporary, 
special purpose Royal Commission. Accordingly a "sunset 
40 Costigan, F QC, "Organised Crime and a Free 
Society" ( 1984) 17 Australian and New Zeal and .Journal 
of Crimjnology 7, 10. 
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clause" was included in the National Crime Authority Act. 
That clause was repealed in 1988 as an element in the 
Government's 1987-1989 organised crime package. 
The National Crime Authority was specifically 
designed to overcome the deficiencies of traditional 
police forces operating in discrete jurisdictions in the 
investigation of 'relevant' offences (defined so as to 
encompass the characteristics of organised criminal 
activity). Its State underpinning legislation allows it 
to investigate relevant offences against State as well as 
Commonwealth law; it can conduct general investigations 
into relevant criminal activity on its own motion; it can 
use coercive powers in special investigations undertaken 
under references granted by Governments, and has access 
to multi-disciplinary expertise. 
A number of accountability mechanisms operate in 
relation to the National Crime Authority: the responsible 
Minister, the Parliamentary Joint Committee and an Inter-
Governmental Committee which monitors the general 
investigations of the Authority, approves special 
references to it after considering whether ordinary 
police methods are likely to be effective in the 
particular case, and seeks to avoid duplication of effort 
and resources. 
Witness Protection 
The establishment of the National Crime Authority 
and the increase in prosecutions relating to organised 
36 
crime raised for the Commonwealth the issue of its 
capacity to guarantee witness protection to maximise 
chances of successful prosecutions. 
The Director of Public Prosecutions may grant 
protection to witnesses appearing before the National 
Crime Authority who might otherwise incriminate 
themselves by answering questions. 
Section 30 of the National Crime Authority Act 
empowers the Commonwealth Director of Public 
Prosecutions, upon the recommendation of the Authority, 
to give an undertaking to witnesses appearing before it 
that evidence given by the witness at a hearing of the 
authority will not be used in evidence in any proceedings 
against the witness for an offence against the laws of 
the Commonwealth (other than proceedings in respect of 
the falsity of the evidence). Similar provisions exist 
in the State underpinning legislation in relation to 
State laws (eg section 19 of the Victorian, New South 
Wales and South Australian Acts). 
Protection against self-incrimination is not the 
only form of protection relevant to witnesses in the 
context of organised crime. Protection against measures 
to prevent the giving of the evidence, or retaliation or 
punishment for having given it may be of as great, or 
even greater importance to the witness. 
The Parliamentary Joint Committee on the National 
Crime Authority reported in 1988 on the issues raised by 
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witness protection, especially accomplice witnesses who 
represent the majority of those requiring protection. 
The Committee expressed concern at the inconsistencies 
and lack of uniform policy between State and Federal 
bodies regarding the granting of indemnities, and also 
showed some distaste for the doing of deals at all with 
criminals, The Committee concluded, however, that 
without the evidence of participants, who were unlikely 
to be available without protection, it would frequently 
be impossible to obtain convictions of principals41, 
In the United States a common method of protecting 
witnesses is relocation under the Victim/Witness 
Protection Program, which can extend to the removal of 
whole families and the provision of complete new 
identities with adjustments to official records to 
prevent back-tracking. 
The Parliamentary Joint Committee questioned the 
desirability of relying on this method of protection on 
the ground that the disadvantages outweigh the 
advantages. Although the criminal witness may welcome a 
complete new start in life, most non-criminal witnesses 
would find it an unattractive proposition to leave a 
settled home, profitable work, a good credit-rating, 
friends and family, and would consider it a high price to 
pay for performing his or her civic duty of giving 
41 
"Witness Protection" Report of the 
Parliamentary Joint Committee on the National Crime 
Authority 1988, paragraphs 5,6-5.7. 
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evidence. Other problems include delays in provision of 
new documentation (a limited, or undeveloped, capacity in 
Australia in any case), which prevents application for 
new jobs and social security, problems with professional 
qualifications and references, educational records and 
forfeiture of credit histories. Problems for the 
community, as opposed to the witness, include the 
enforcement of a non-custodial parents rights of access 
to children, enforcement of civil debts and problems for 
investigating authorities in tracing past criminal 
records of protected witnesses who commit offences in the 
place of relocation42, 
The Australian practice has been variable from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Victoria's practice of 
using 24-hour guarding at safe locations until testimony 
has been given is expensive and unpleasant both for 
witness, and family, and guards. After testifying, fares 
for relocation are provided, together with a small sum 
for re-establishment. New South Wales and the Australian 
Federal Police employ relocation, but have a very limited 
capacity to provide documentation for a new identity43, 
The Parliamentary Joint Committee recommended that 
the Australian Federal Police Protection Branch should 
assume an expanded national witness protection role, 
extending the service to other agencies on a user pays 
42 
43 
Ibid, paragraphs 3.13-3.18. 
Ibid, paragraphs 4.4-4.8. 
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principle. Funding was recommended to be by means of an 
initial increase in Commonwealth appropriations, but that 
this should decrease through the operation of the user 
pays principle and by the application of revenue 
generated by forfeiture of assets and the raising of 
revenue assessments against those involved in organised 
criminal activity. 
The Commonwealth has accepted the recommendation of 
the Parliamentary Joint Committee that the Australian 
Federal Police assume a national role and that a National. 
Witness Protection Liaison committee be established under 
the auspices of the Australian Police Ministers' Council 
to facilitate co-ordination and co-operation in the area. 
The proposal was endorsed by the Australian Police 
Ministers' Council in November 1988. 
The Commonwealth's Attempt to Establjsh a National 
Identification Scheme 
Having established the National Crime Authority and 
perpetuated the accumulated information, expertise and 
methodology of the Costigan royal Commission, the 
Government sought to facilitate the Authority's 
performance of its task in combatting organised crime, 
and to make money laundering and tax evasion more 
difficult, by providing legislatively for a national 
identification system to be known as the 'Australia 
Card'. 
40 
The bottom-of-the-harbour tax evasion schemes 
exposed by the Costigan Royal Commission provided the 
impetus for the Australia Card proposal, which was mainly 
directed at preventing tax evasion and health and welfare 
fraud, but, as Dr Blewett pointed out in the Second 
Reading Speech: "One spin-off of this enhanced pursuit 
of the money trail will be an improved assault on 
corporate and organised crime" 44 • 
However, the Australia Card proposal marked the 
point at which, politically, the interest in controlling 
large scale fraud and pursuing the money trail to combat 
organised crime was suddenly outweighed by the resistance 
of most Australians and their representatives in the 
Senate to what was perceived as regimentation and 
intrusive Government supervision, 
It also highlighted the problems of Government in 
implementing controversial proposals when it does not 
have control of the Senate. 
Section 51(ii) of the Constitution was the power 
relied on to mount the proposed national identification 
system. The system would have required production of the 
identification card to: 
open or continue any account with a bank or 
financial institution; 
44 cf Freiberg, A. "Ripples from the Bottom of 
the Harbour: Some social Ramifications of Taxation 
Fraud" (1988) 12 Criminal I.aw Journal 136 1 170,172. 
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invest with Government or semi-Government bonds, 
solicitors' trust accounts or other interest bearing 
investments; 
invest in trusts, cash management or property 
trusts; 
derive primary production incomes through marketing 
authorities and produce agents; rental income 
through real estate agents; and non-salary or non-
wage income through government agencies by doctors, 
chemists and other professional persons or entities; 
send money overseas (all remittances over $50,000 to 
be reported to the Australian Tax Office); 
all real estate transactions; 
hold or use a safety deposit box 
buy shares or futures; 
apply for work, including work done on a contract 
basis; and 
identify a person seeking registration as a group 
employer or for sales tax purposes. 45 
There was to be a companion system to identify and 
record transactions of entities and bodies which were not 
natural persons for purposes of taxation. 
45 Report of the Joint Select Committee on an 
Australia Card May 1986, paragraph 1.10, 
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These proposed uses would be constitutionally valid 
if the transaction involved attracted taxation or 
affected the tax liability of a person or had an 
incidental role in the collection of tax or the 
suppression of tax avoidance. Requirements for 
production in relation to social security, unemployment, 
health or other benefits under Commonwealth programs 
which were also proposed would have been valid under the 
relevant head of power supporting the particular program. 
It was also intended that State and Territory 
births, deaths and marriages records be computerised (if 
necessary by Commonwealth acquisition, including 'just 
terms' compensation pursuant to s 51(xxxi) if required). 
Access to the database was to be limited to verification 
of documentation submitted for the purpose of obtaining 
nominated services from the Commonwealth by specified 
Departments. Safeguards were to have included the 
establishment of a Data Protection Agency, individual 
rights of access to and correction of personal data and 
the introduction of privacy legislation and legislation 
to modify bank secrecy rules and to require the reporting 
of fraudulent or suspected fraudulent transactions46 . 
The joint Select Committee acknowledged that the 
contemplated use of the Australia Card might be a useful 
tool in fighting organised crime. It would counter the 
use of fictitious identities, facilitate tracing the 
46 Ibid, pp xix-xxii. 
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money trail through banks and financial institutions and 
the identification of controllers of criminal 
organisations by linkage of the money and identity 
trails, 
Nevertheless, in Costigan's emphatic opinion, the 
proposal was like using a jackhammer to crack a nut. He 
considered that many of the anticipated benefits were 
illusory, and achievable by other means, while its 
disadvantages were significant and serious in their 
intrusiveness and in the probable future extension of the 
card's applications47 
In its Report of 20 May 1986 the Joint Select 
Committee rejected the proposal on civil liberties 
grounds and on the basis of fundamental doubts of its 
appropriateness and cost-effectiveness to solve problems 
of tax avoidance and evasion and other fraudulent 
activity, the majority being persuaded by the views of Mr 
Costigan48 . 
The Bill was twice rejected by the Senate and 
constituted the basis for double dissolution under 
section 57 of the Constitution in June 1987. What 
followed, after the Government was returned to office 
with a sufficient majority in both Houses to achieve 
passage of the Bill at a joint sitting, was described in 
47 
48 
Ibid, paragraphs 3,9, 4.2. 
Ibid, paragraphs 4.1-4.2. 
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the Australian Law Journal's Current Topics as "a 
political and constitutional bombshe11• 49 • 
The Opposition announced a fatal flaw in the bill. 
Its operational clauses were specified to come into 
effect 'on or after the first relevant day'. That day 
was defined in clause 32(1) of Part IV as 'a day declared 
by the regulations to be the first relevant day for the 
purposes of this Part, not being a day that is earlier 
than 1 March 1989 1 • 
The then leader of the Liberal Opposition, Mr 
Howard, painted what he claimed was an inevitable 
scenario. An Opposition-controlled Senate could, 
pursuant to section 48 of the Acts Interpretation Act 
lJLQJ., disallow the regulation, whereupon, by virtue of 
that section the declaring regulation would become void 
and of no effect as if there had been a repeal; no first 
relevant day would exist and accordingly no operational 
clauses could come into force. 
Various ways around the problem were explored by 
the Government, including the obvious one of amending the 
Bill to commence by proclamation. However, as pointed 
out in Current Topics50 , the wording of section 57 of the 
Constitution either precluded or cast doubt upon the 
power of the Government to initiate the necessary 
amendment during the period after the double dissolution. 
49 
50 
{1988) 62 Australian Law Jgurnal 6, 7. 
Ibid, 9. 
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Another possible option mooted was to view the 
provision for declaration of the relevant first day as 
directory rather than mandatory and proceed by 
proclamation, but if, as seemed likely, the requirement 
for declaration were interpreted as a condition precedent 
for commencement of the operational clauses, that 
argument would fail51, 
It was also argued that the defeating of the 
legislation once passed at a joint sitting by 
disallowance of the regulation represented a breach of 
constitutional convention, being an improper exercise of 
the power of the Senate for the ulterior purpose of 
frustrating legislation. 
In any event, to proceed on the basis of any of the 
possible options would inevitably have involved delay 
through legal challenges and uncertainty as to the nature 
of any decision the High Court might ultimately make, 
assuming that it would accept jurisdiction to examine the 
legislative process in determining the procedure 
permitted by section 57. It had previously done so in 
cases such as Cormack v 1&ll..e.52, determining whether 
prescribed procedure had been followed, and in cases 
following the 1975 double dissolution, including the 
51 
Employees' 
(1979) 143 
52 
cf .Egan v Shop Di stributi ye 
Federation of Australia and 
CLR 325. 
{1974) 131 CLR 432. 
and Allied 
New South Wales 
46 
Petroleum and Minerals Authority Case 53 in which it was 
held that the procedure laid down in section 57, as it 
applied to that case, was mandatory, not directory, 
The Government formally announced on 29 September 
1987 that it was abandoning the Australia Card. It fell 
back on an up-graded tax file number for use in the ten 
previously enumerated Australian Tax Office uses that had 
been proposed for the Australia Card; the fact that a 
tax file number was sent in the mail to numerous dead 
people on the issue of the improved numbers perhaps 
vindicates those who had some doubts of the Government's 
capacity to maintain the Australia Card system with the 
promised level of integrity and safeguards. 
Priyacy Safeguards Associated with the Identlfication 
System 
The Privacy Bill, which embodied safeguards 
proposed in relation to the Australia Card project, arose 
out of the Australian Law Reform Commission Report on 
Privacy (No 22, 1983) which expressed concern at the 
incomplete protection given to privacy interests in 
Commonwealth legislation, even at that time, which 
predated legislative efforts to keep track of identity 
and financial transactions for revenue and law 
enforcement purposes. 
53 Yictoria v Commonwealth (1975) 134 CLR 81. 
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The Privacy Bill was to have been relevant to the 
proposal for the establishment of the Australia Card 
Register and questions of access to the Register, 
Apart from privacy legislation, sections 70 and 79 
of the Crimes Act 1914, section 51(1) of the Public 
Service Act 1922 and regulation 35 of the Public Service 
Regulations provide the framework for controlling 
disclosure of personal information by government 
officials working in record-keeping systems. There are 
also legislative provisions which specifically require 
non-disclosure of personal information for example, the 
Social Security Act 1947 and the Income Tax Assessment 
Act 1936. 
However, the Australian Law Reform Commission noted 
that 'the basic framework might be criticised as allowing 
discretionary secrecy. And that which allows 
"discretionary secrecy• also allows "discretionary 
disclosure•• 54 
The Report of the Joint Select Committee on an 
Australia Card recommended the introduction of privacy 
legislation based on the Australian Law Reform Commission 
recommendations as soon as possible, irrespective of 
whether the Australia Card proposal were adopted55, 
54 Australian Law Reform Commission Report No 22, 
Vol 1, paragraph 948, 
55 Report of the Joint Select Committee on an 
Australia Card May 1986, paragraph 2.42. 
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The Privacy Act 1988 provides in relation to the 
use of tax file numbers as it would have in relation to 
the proposed Australia Card Register: section 28 confers 
functions in relation to tax file numbers on the Privacy 
Commissioner, including investigations, audits and the 
monitoring of tax records to ensure compliance with the 
law. He may issue guidelines for collection, storage and 
security of tax file number information, and section 18 
of the Act imposes a duty on a tax file number recipient 
to comply with those guidelines. 
The Privacy Commissioner may, pursuant to sections 
27 and 40, investigate an act or practice of an agency 
that may breach an Information Privacy Principle set out 
under section 14, except that certain persons or bodies 
are exempted from the operation of section 27, including 
the National Crime Authority. Section 49 provides that 
the Privacy Commissioner.' s investigation into a matter 
must cease if he forms the opinion that a tax file number 
offence has been committed (that is, an offence under 
sections 8WA or 8WB of the Taxat.jon Administration Act, 
l..9..i2. or against sections 6, 7, 7A or 86(1)(a) of the 
Crimes Act 1914) in which case he must inform the 
Commissioner of Police or the Director of Public 
Prosecutions, 
The Privacy Commissioner also performs a monitoring 
and auditing role in relation to the privacy aspects of 
the operational procedures of the Cash Transaction 
Reports Agency, which in most respects is protected from 
49 
external supervision; (the Cash Transactions Reports Bill 
had originally been introduced as part of the Australia 
Card and Privacy package, the intention being that the 
Australia Card would be used as proof of identity as 
required by the Bill), The Admjnistratiye Decisions 
(Judicial Reyjewl Act 1977 does not apply to decisions 
under the Cash Transaction Reports Act 1988 (by virtue of 
section 42 of the latter Act) and it is probable that 
applications under the Freedom of Information Act 1982 
are excluded by the effect of the Secrecy and Access 
provisions of Part IV of the Cash Transaction Reports 
Act, which arguably constitute a code governing 
disclosure of information under the Act. 
MONEY LAUNDERING AND CIVIL REMEDIES 
Money Laundering 
Following the Australia Card package set-back, the 
government embarked in 1987 on a concentrated program of 
legislative measures designed to suppress organised crime 
by facilitating investigation and prosecution, removing 
its profitability and increasing its risk, and depriving 
criminals of the otherwise (possibly) legal services of 
accountants, solicitors, bankers and other advisers and 
others involved in financial transactions by creating a 
serious offence of money laundering (above pp 16-24). 
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Prior to the new legislation any cash dealer who 
was knowingly concerned in or party to the commission of 
a Commonwealth offence, or who knowingly assisted another 
person to escape punishment or to dispose of the proceeds 
of such an offence, could only be prosecuted under 
sections 5 or 6 of the Crimes Act 1914. 
Now, as Bostock points out56 , through the 
interaction of the Proceeds of Crime Act and the Cash 
Transaction Reports Act, a cash dealer may be in an 
uncomfortably vulnerable position in circumstances where 
he or she would have been blameless under the general law 
of complicity, 
Section 16(1) of the Cash Transaction Reports Act 
imposes on a cash dealer an obligation to report to the 
director of the Cash Transaction Reports Agency any 
transaction concerning which he or she has 'reasonable 
grounds to suspect' that information relating to it may 
be relevant to investigation of an evasion, or attempted 
evasion, of a taxation law; to an investigation or 
prosecution of a person for a Commonwealth or Territory 
offence; or of assistance in the enforcement of the 
Proceeds of Crime Act or regulations. The Explanatory 
Memorandum gives the reason for the mental element of 
'reasonable grounds to suspect' as being 'so that lower 
threshhold will alleviate the need for cash dealers to 
56 Bostock, T E, "Observations on the Cash 
Transactions Legislation" Australian Tax Review 
September 1989 147, 148-152. 
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undertake intensive investigation before being able to 
pass on information to the Director'. 
Section 17 of the Cash Transaction Reports Act 
provides: 
Where a cash dealer, or a person who is an 
officer, employee or agent of a cash dealer, 
communicates or gives information under section 
16, the cash dealer or person shall be taken, 
for the purposes of sections 81 and 82 of the 
Proceeds of Crime Act 1987 not to have been in 
possession of that information at any time. 
Section 81 of the Proceeds of Crime Act creates the 
offence of money laundering if a person: 
(a) engages, directly or indirectly, in a 
transaction that involves money, or other 
property, that is proceeds of crime; or 
(b) receives, possesses, conceals, disposes of 
or brings into Australia, any money, or 
other property, that is proceeds of crime; 
and the person knows, or ought reasonably to 
have known, that the money or other property is 
derived or realised, directly or indirectly, 
from some form of unlawful activity. 
The penalty for that offence is a maximum of 
$200,000 fine or 20 years imprisonment or both for a 
natural person; a fine of $600,000 for a body corporate. 
It appears that by failing to report to the 
Director of the Cash Transaction Reports Agency pursuant 
to section 16 in a situation where he or she did not feel 
he or she had reasonable grounds to suspect that a 
transaction was within sub-paragraph l6(l)(b)(i), (ii) or 
(iii), a cash dealer does not acquire the protection of 
section 17 regarding the possession of information. This 
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may ultimately lead a jury to believe on the basis of 
that information that he or she "ought reasonably to have 
known" that the money involved in the transaction derived 
from some form of unlawful activity. 
Instead of committing an offence of refusing or 
failing to communicate information to the director under 
sub-section 28(1) of the Cash Transaction Reports Act, 
with a subjective fault element and a penalty of up to 
$5,000 or 2 years imprisonment, or both, he or she may be 
convicted, on the basis of an objective test, of an 
offence under section 81 of the Proceeds of Crime Act, 
punishable by up to $200,000 fine or 20 years 
imprisonment or both. 5 7 
The Cash Transaction Reports Act also seems to 
expose cash dealers (including officers, employees and 
agents) to civil actions for breach of confidence or 
defamation by customers in respect of reports made under 
sub-section 16(1). 
Bostock58points out that, although sub-section 
16(5) purports to protect the cash dealer from civil 
proceedings arising out of action taken pursuant to 
section 16, a cash dealer seeking to rely on that 
protection would arguably need to establish that he or 
she had reasonable grounds to suspect that the 
57 cf Bostock, T E. "Observations on the Cash 
Transactions Legislation" Australian Tax Reyiew 
September 1989 147, 152. 
58 Ibid, 150. 
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transaction fell within one of the three categories 
described in paragraph 16(1)(b). 
Thus the cash dealer may feel that he or she is 
between the devil and the deep blue sea. In order to 
gain the protection of section 17 and avoid being 
vulnerable to section 81 of the Proceeds of Crime Act he 
or she may be drawn to a liberal interpretation of 
'reasonable grounds to suspect' and, when in doubt, 
report to the Director; but in order to gain the 
protection of sub-section 16(5) he or she must take a 
stringent view of the phrase such as would justify action 
pursuant to sub-section 16(1) in a court of law. 
Moreover, sub-paragraph 16(1)(b)li) requires that a 
cash dealer report a transaction of which he has 
reasonable grounds to suspect that information relating 
to it may be relevant to the investigation of an evasion 
or attempted evasion of a tax law. An entire legal 
specialty is devoted to exploring the fine line between 
tax avoidance and tax evasion, and no definition of tax 
evasion is provided for the cash dealer in the Act. 
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As Bostock describes the problem: 
At one time there was a recognised distinction 
between evasion on the one hand, as involving 
either concealing assessable income or making 
false claims for deductions, and avoidance on 
the other, which was the exercise of the right 
of the citizen to arrange his affairs according 
to law in such a way as to be liable for the 
least tax possible. There is no doubt that 
over the last twenty years that distinction has 
become blurred, even obliterated, in the minds 
of the lay public, and even, to a degree, in 
the minds of some judges. And the distinction 
is blurred in any event by such measures as s 
260 of the Income Tax Assessment5~ct and its successor, Part IVA of that Act. 
For serious offences there is a strong tradition in 
the High Court that a subjective fault element will be 
required unless the relevant legislative provision 
renders such a requirement impossible (see, for example, 
He Kaw Teh 6 0. 
The Proceeds of Crime Act also offends in other 
ways against established principles by providing for a 
reversed onus of proof in sections 19(6)(c), 27(6) and 
82; section 85 imposes vicarious, and therefore strict, 
liability on individual and corporate defendants for the 
offences in sections 81, 82 and 83, even though the 
offences are serious and carry severe penalties, 
including imprisonment up to 20 years61 
59 
60 
61 
Rise of 
(1989) 
Ibid, 14 9, 
!1985) 111 CLR 610. 
cf Fisse, B. 
Money Laundering 
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Civil Remedies 
If the Cash Transaction Reports Act interacts with 
the Proceeds of Crime Act in such a way as to render an 
environment previously friendly to organised crime 
hostile and dangerous so that it is now difficult for 
criminals to use the services of honest cash dealers to 
launder the proceeds of crime, then the proliferation of 
civil remedies which threaten those proceeds has altered 
dramatically the balance between level of risk and 
profitability. It is no longer easy for lower level 
criminals to 'take the rap' for satisfactory 
compensation, while the organisers and the proceeds of 
the crime remain at a safe distance from law enforcement. 
The Cash Transaction Reports Act facilitates the tracing 
of the money trail beyond the lower level offender to the 
higher level organiser or organisers. 
Even before the legislative package of the late 
80s, specifically directed against organised crime, use 
was made of existing powers to compel the production of 
documents and conduct compulsory examinations (eg 
sections 263, 264 of the Income tax Assessment Act 1936, 
section 69 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966, section 541 of the 
Companies Code and section 243F(l)(d) of the Customs Act 
lilll..l). 
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The power to impose forfeiture provisions was 
upheld by the High Court in Burton v Honan, per Dixon 
CJ:62 
Once the subject matter is fairly within the 
province of the federal legislature the justice 
and wisdom of the provision which it makes in 
the exercise of its power over the subject 
matter are matters entirely for the legislature 
and not for the judiciary. 
The Special Prosecutors Act 1982 (an interim 
measure arising out of the Costigan Royal Commission) 
provided a civil remedies function exercisable at any 
time. The Director of Public Prosecutions Act 1983 
restricted the civil remedies function so that the 
Director could only exercise it after a prosecution had 
been instituted. This restriction was removed, under 
pressure from Royal Commissioners Costigan and Stewart 
and former Sypecial Prosecutor Redlich, in 1985. 
Civil remedies were also provided in the Taxation 
Administration Act (section 8A(l)) and the Customs Act 
(Div 3, Part XIII). Mareva injunctions were available to 
protect assets in danger of dissipation. 
The Proceeds of Crime Act creates in Part II 
Division 1 a two-pronged confiscation order in relation 
to persons convicted of indictable offences: 
s14(1)(a) directed against 'tainted property', 
defined ins 4(1) as property used 
in, or in connection with, the 
62 (1952) 86 CLR 169, 179. 
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commission of an offence, or the 
proceeds of an offence; or 
s 14(l)(b) a pecuniary penalty order directed at 
benefits derived by a person from the 
commission of an offence. 
Power to conduct the relevant litigation is vested 
in the Director of Public Prosecutions, who may also, 
under the procedure laid down in sections 43-65, apply 
for restraining orders, including foreign restraining 
orders registered under the Mutual Assistance Act. If 
there has not been a conviction, affidavit evidence is 
required from a police officer to the effect that he or 
she believes that the defendant has committed the 
relevant offence and that the property is tainted 
property or that the defendant obtained a benefit from 
the commission of the offence. It is not necessary to 
demonstrate that there is a risk that the assets will be 
dissipated, and the civil standard of proof applies. 
Some Judicial Consjderation of Restraining and 
Confiscation and Pecuniary Penalty Orders 
There has as yet been relatively little judicial 
consideration of the organised crime package. However, 
the arguably draconian effect of the restraining, 
confiscation and pecuniary penalty orders provided by the 
Proceeds of Crime Act, and similar provisions in the 
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Customs Act, have not escaped caustic comment from the 
bench. 
In Abraham Gilbert Saffron (No 4l 63Kirby J referred 
to the novel and drastic aspects of the Proceeds of Crime 
Act and said: 
A court will give effect to the will of 
Parliament. It will do so, if that will is 
clear, even in a penal statute and despite 
drastic consequences for those affected, But 
if there is ambiguity, a court will prefer a 
construction which observes and upholds time 
honoured civic rights. 
In Director of Public Prosecut.jons (commonwealth} v 
Velimir Markoyskt 64 Teague J wrestled with the issues 
involved in the granting and extending of restraining 
orders under ss.43 and 45 of the Proceeds of Crime Act. 
He ref erred to the concern of Carter J in Re an 
Application P11rsuant to the Drugs Misuse Act l98665that a 
restraining order under comparable provisions constituted 
a "restraint upon the exercise of fundamental rights in 
respect of property which a person may need to use in the 
course of his everyday living". But his Honour also 
weighed the possibility of disspation of assets to thwart 
recovery if no action could be taken until after 
conviction. Of considerable concern to him in the 
exercise of his discretion was the issue of the 
reasonableness of the grounds for the police officer's 
63 (1989) 39 A Crim R 353 at 357. 
64 Supreme Court of Victoria 19 October 1990, 
65 [1988] 2 Qd R 506 at 508. 
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belief, as to which he is required to be satisfied under 
s.44(3((b) of the Proceeds of Crime Act, that the 
defendant committed the offence with which he was 
charged. The question of reasonableness concerned him 
when considered against the likelihood, or substantial 
possibility, of insuperable problems being encountered in 
leading admissible evidence directed to obtaining a 
conviction. This conflict was resolved by reference to 
an old case, Hicks v Faulkner66quoted with approval in 
Davis v ~67 : 
The question of reasonableness and probable 
cause depends in all cases, not upon the actual 
existence, but upon the reasonable bona fide 
belief in the existence of such a state of 
things as would amount to a justification of 
the course pursued in making the accusation 
complained of - no matter whether this belief 
arises out of the recollection and memory of 
the accuser, or out of information furnished to 
him by another. It is not essential in any 
case that facts should be established proper 
and fit and admissible as evidence to be 
submitted to the jury upon an issue as to the 
actual guilt of the accused. The distinction 
between facts to establish actual guilt and 
those required to establish a bona fide belief 
in guilt should never be lost sight of 
inconsidering such cases as I am now 
discussing. Many facts admissible to prove the 
latter would be wholly inadmissible to prove 
the former. 
Connolly J, in Bauer v ll.££68 , was called upon to 
consider the effect of s.48(4)(e)(i) of the Proceeds of 
Crime Act which places the burden of proof upon the owner 
of property to have it excluded from a restraining order. 
66 
67 
68 
(1878) 8 QBD 167 at 173, 
(1924) 35 CLR 275. 
(1989) 91 ALR 491. 
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In that lack of evidence that it was so used is 
insufficient to satisfy the burden, his Honour perceived 
the burden to be extremely onerous, commenting that it 
"requires no imagination to g1ve examples of situations 
where it could never be discharged although no unlawful 
activity might have occurred at all". 
Recently the Full Court of the Federal Court, in 
Razzi v Commissioner of Australian Federal Police69, 
examined, in the context of s.243B(3) of the Customs Act 
1..9..Q.l., the effect of the words "benefits derived by a 
person from the commission .of an offence" which 
correspond to the terms of s.26(l)(b) of the Proceeds of 
Crime Act. 
Mrs Razzi appealed from a pecuniary penalty order 
made on the basis that she was aware of the general 
nature of her husband's drug trafficking operation and 
particularly that it concerned the importation of heroin, 
and also that the purchase of properties in joint names 
prior to the relevant importation indicated a readiness 
by Mr Razzi to share his assets with his wife, 
The Full Court held that more than a "readiness to 
share" on Mr Razzi's part was required to justify a 
finding that Mrs Razzi had received a valuable benefit 
from the importation - an expectation of a benefit is not 
a benefit derived (Davies J, plO; Jenkinson J, p6; Hill J 
concurring. 
69 Sydney 2 November 1990, 
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The issue of "tainted property" pursuant to s.44 of 
the Proceeds of Crime Act was considered by Higgins J in 
In the Matter of Section 43 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 
1987 and In the Matter of an Application by the Di rector 
of Public Prosecutions for a Restraining Order in respect 
of Block 6 Section 3 Ainslie in Deposited Plan 25 being 
the Whole of the I,and in Certificate of title Volume 690 
Folio 270 • 
In the event his Honour's comments on the subject 
of tainted property were obiter dicta since he found it 
unnecessary to decide whether the property in question 
were tainted as the offences involved were "serious 
offences" in relation to which such a finding was not 
required by s.44(1) of the Proceeds of Crime Act. 
However, the issues he canvassed may be relevant in 
future cases where indictable offences are involved. 
In passing, Higgins J casts doubt on whether the 
forfeiture of all of a person's property (in contrast to 
the forfeiture of the proceeds and instruments of crime) 
by reason of that person's status as a convict would 
constitute property acquired "on just terms" by the 
Commonwealth under pl.51(xxxi) of the Constitution71 • 
His Honour also expressed the view that the 
confiscation provisions applied only to property capable 
of being physically seized, saying "forfeiture of realty 
70 
71 
Supreme Court ACT 12 September 1990. 
!bid pl7. 
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whereon an offence has occurred seems to me to go beyond 
that which was intended by the legislature" 72 
A further issue raised in Razzj, though not 
important in the particular circumstances of that case, 
concerned the problem of the conversion of tainted 
property into money, where this is in the best interests 
of all parties for the management of the asset. It 
appears likely that, although the asset itself may be 
tainted, once converted into money, that money may not be 
tainted, and accordingly may not be subject to a 
restraining order.73 
Parallel Proceedjngs 
Defendants have had little success in arguing that 
involvement in parallel civil and/or administrative 
proceedings and criminal proceedings exposed him or her 
to the risk of injustice. 
In Hammond v Commonwealth of Australia74it was held 
that if a person were required to answer a question 
before a Royal Commission designed to establish that he 
72 
73 
74 
Ibid pl7. 
Ibid p13. 
(1982) 152 CLR 188. 
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was guilty of an offence with which he had been charged 
before a court, there was a real risk of interference 
with the administration of justice, Deane J said: 
••. it is fundamental to the administration of 
criminal justice that a person who is the 
subject of pending criminal proceedings in a 
court of law should not be subjected to having 
his part in the matters involved in those 
criminal proceedings made the subject of a 
parallel inquisitorial inquiry by an 
administrative tribunal with powers to compel 
the giving of evidence and the production of 
documents which largely correspond (and to some 
extent exceed) the powers of the criminal 
court. 
Nevertheless, in Saunders v The Commissioner for 
Taxation75 the applicant, who was simultaneously 
confronted with a charge of conspiracy to defraud the 
Commonwealth, an imminent compulsory examination under 
section 263 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 and was 
involved in administrative and appeal proceedings in 
relation to a number of tax matters, was denied his 
application for an order to restrain the taxation officer 
from exercising his power under section 263. Northrop J, 
in denying the relief, accepted that the Director of 
Public Prosecutions would receive information from the 
tax examination for use in pursuing civil remedies but 
that it would not be used in criminal proceedings, and so 
created no risk of interference in the criminal process 
and no conflict with the High Court's decision in the 
Hammond Case. A similar decision was made by Ryan J in 
75 (1988) 19 ATR 3715. 
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Ahern v The Commissioner for Taxation 76 , but in Oades v 
Hamilton 77 the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal 
in intended exercise of its inherent power to stay 
proceedings in the interests of justice, made orders 
preventing examination under section 541 of the Companies 
Code on facts which were at the heart of the criminal 
offences with which the applicant was charged. The High 
Court, however, on appeal by the liquidator and the 
Corporate Affairs Commission set aside the orders of the 
Court of Appeal holding that they were not of a kind 
permissible under section 541 or in exercise of the 
inherent power of the Court in the light of the statutory 
provisions and the public purposes that the examination 
was designed to serve. 78 
The Poor Defendant 
A somewhat unsympathetic attitude seems also to 
have been taken to complaints by those who have suffered 
forfeiture or pecuniary penalties, prior to trial on 
criminal charges, that the action deprived them of funds 
for their defence. 
76 (1986) 17 ATR 535. 
77 (1987) ACLC 371. 
78 Hamilton v Oades; Corporate Affairs commission 
of New So11th Wales v Oades and another (1989) 85 ALR 1. 
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Carter J in Maher7 9 washed his hands of 
responsibility when the defendant claimed that an attempt 
had been made by the Director of Public Prosecutions and 
the Commissioner of Taxation to cripple him financially 
by depriving him of funds for his defence, saying: 
It is not for me to comment on the procedures 
taken by the Commissioner in seeking to protect 
the revenue. The Director is concerned with 
the prosecution of the accused for a criminal 
offence; the commissioner is concerned to 
protect the revenue by pursuing civil remedies, 
statutory or otherwise, towards that end. 
In the United States the Bench has been similarly 
impervious to such pleas: 
But when a defendant claims that he has 
suffered some substantial impairment of his 
Sixth Amendment rights by virtue of the seizure 
or forfeiture of assets in his possession, such 
a complaint is no more than the reflection of 
'the harsh reality that the quality of the 
criminal defendant's representation frequently 
may turn on his ability to retain the best 
counsel money can buy .•• ' Again, the Court of 
appeals put it aptly: 'The modern day Jean 
Valjean must be satisfied with appointed 
counsel. Yet the drug merchant claims that his 
possession of huge sums of money •.. entitles him 
to something more. We reject this contention, 
and any notion of a constitutional right to use 
the proceeds of crime to finance ftB expensive 
defence (837 F 2d, at 649, n. 7). 
Ian Temby QC gave consideration to this issue in 
his review of the Proceeds of Crime Act after one year of 
79 
514. 
80 
(1989) us 
Maher v Attorney-General (Cth\ (1985) 5 FCR 
Caplin & Drysdale. Chartered v United States 
LEXIS 3124. 
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operation81 • He accepts that when assets are frozen 
prior to the trial of a defendant two principles can be 
seen to be in conflict: the entitlement of a defendant 
to representation by solicitors and counsel of his or her 
choice, and the entitlement of society not to finance 
that representation through applying criminal profits to 
meet its cost. 
Temby states that in practice primacy has been 
given to the first principle and frozen funds have been 
released pursuant to paragraph 43(3)(b) to provide proper 
legal representation when no other funds were available. 
But he also notes that there is a tendency for defendant 
and counsel to ignore the normal equation between costs 
and benefits and 'spend like a drunken sailor on a spree' 
because if the trial results in a conviction the money 
will go to the Government in any event. 
If that trend continues, in Temby's view, paragraph 
43(3)(b) (or paragraph 243E(4l(c), Customs Act) claims 
should be resisted on the basis that proper 
representation can be provided by means of legal aid. 
Echoing the US Court of Appeals previously cited, he 
suggests legislative change so that: 
81 Temby, I, "The Proceeds of Crime Act: One 
Year's Experience" ( 1989) 13 Criminal I.aw Journal 24. 
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alleged miscreants such as drug bosses who 
happen to have very large and apparently 
illicitly obtained property should not be put 
on a more advantageous basis than other 
criminals, that is to say should be R~t on to 
legal aid like their poorer fellows. 
Fisse8 3 also points out that, where paragraph 
43(3)(b) (or similar provisions) are not called into play 
because the defendant still, at the relevant time, has 
the means to meet his or her expenses, nevertheless, fees 
paid to lawyers may be vulnerable to forfeiture as 
proceeds of crime, or, in a worst case scenario, receipt 
of fees might in some cases constitute the offence of 
money laundering, and legal representatives may need to 
trust that the prosecutorial discretion will always be 
exercised in their favour. 
In Fisse's view, the argument that criminals should 
not be entitled to unlimited funds for their defence is 
specious. The confiscation provisions of the Proceeds of 
Crime Act are conviction based and it is premature to 
strip the defendant of economic power until criminality 
is established, and until that time there should be no 
restriction except the defendant's own judgement on 
expenditure for legal assistance 84 • 
There has been some judicial comment on the 
implications for legal representation of the restraining 
82 Ibid, 29. 
8 3, Fisse, B. •confiscation of Proceeds of Crime: 
Funny Money, Serious Legislation" (1989) 13 Criminal 
I,aw Journal 3 86, 3 91 , 
84 Ibid, 393, 
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order provisions, In Deputy Commissioner for Taxation 
and PPP v KJ.mz.85 Vincent J considered it rather 
disquieting to find a prosecuting authority, through its 
counsel, providing support for an application in which it 
would appear to have little real interest and which, if 
successful, may well restrict the capacity of the 
respondent to defend himself against charges laid by that 
authority. 
In Cammi ssi oner of the Australian Federal Pol ice v 
Amad Malkoun and ors86 which involved variation of orders 
made under s.243E of the Customs Act to allow payment of 
legal costs for committal proceedings, Ryan J held that 
there was no specific onus cast upon an applicant to 
affirmatively establish as a precondition of relief that 
he had fully complied with orders as to disclosure of 
assets or that he did not have assets other than those 
under the control of the Official Trustee from which to 
meet his legal fees, these matters being factors to be 
taken into account by the Court in exercising its 
discretion. Nor was his Honour prepared to leave the 
funding of the defence to the speculative availability of 
legal aid, though refusing the defendants unrestricted 
access to the assets subject to the s.243E order by 
limiting each defendant to an amount up to $30,000 for 
the costs of the trial. 
85 unreported judgment No45 of 1989 Supreme Court 
of Victoria. 
86 unreported, Ryan J, 1.2.1989, Fed.Ct (Vic), 
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Proportionality of Punishment to Crime 
In the case of 'serious offences' all the 
defendant's property (owned at the time of the 
application for a pecuniary penalty order and acquired 
since the earliest relevant offence, or within the 
previous five years, whichever is the lesser period of 
time) is, by virtue of sub-section 27(6) of the Proceeds 
of Crime Act, presumed to be the proceeds of crime, 
unless the contrary is proved, A 'serious offence' is a 
serious narcotics offence, as defined in section 7, 
organised fraud, section 83, or money laundering in 
relation to the proceeds of either, section 81, 
Fisse considers that the Proceeds of Crime Act 
authorises recovery of tainted property and proceeds of 
crime which comprehend more than the profit made from an 
offence, for example, a $1m ocean cruiser used to import 
cannabis resin with a street value of $100.000 may be 
confiscated as tainted property8 7, 
Proportionality has always operated as a constraint 
in sentencing and was endorsed by the High Court in Ye..en 
v The Queen (No 2188 when all members of the Court 
endorsed the principle that a sentence should be 
proportional to the gravity of the offence, and rejected 
the view that a sentence could be increased to exceed 
87 
88 
Ibid, 376. 
(1988) 164 CLR 465 
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proportionality to protect society against a repetition 
of the offence. 
There is nothing in the Proceeds of Crime Act to 
require that proportionality be taken into account when 
considering the combined operation of sentence and 
pecuniary penalty orders. Ian Temby QC wrote, while 
still Director of Public Prosecutions, that a person 
convicted of one of the specified 'serious offences' 
"faces the risk of not just imprisonment, or the payment 
of a fine, or forfeiture of the proceeds of crime, or 
loss of property involved in the commission of the 
offence, but the loss of everything of a material 
nature• 89 . 
No challenges of this aspect of the legislation 
have, as yet, occurred, despite Fisse's view that the 
provisions may result in 'cruel and unusual punishment'90 
or acquisition of property otherwise than on just terms 
in contravention of placitum 51(xxxi) of the 
Constitution, 
When Special Prosecutor Robert Redlich pioneered 
the use of civil remedies against organised crime he saw 
those remedies as crucial in limiting the activity of 
criminals by denying them access to funds and assets. 
This was done primarily by the issue of taxation 
513. 
89 
90 
(1988) 23(3) Australian Law News 10, 11-12. 
cf Sillery v The Queen (1981) 55 ALJR 509, at 
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assessments by the Taxation Office and the use of Mareva 
injunctions to freeze the relevant assets until liability 
was decided. 
On a similar line of reasoning, a major goal of the 
Proceeds of Crime Act is to incapacitate offenders, 
especially those engaged in drug trafficking, by 
depriving them of their economic power91, Arguably the 
goal of the legislation is not punishment, proportional 
or otherwise, but prevention - the incapacitation of 
existing criminals, deterrence of others who might 
consider entering the field, and the creation of an 
inhospitable environment by draconian penalties for money 
laundering with a fault element that includes an 
objective test that is far less demanding than the mens 
rea for any form of complicity in a major offence. 
IDEOLOGICAL ISSUES 
The philosophical inheritance which underpins 
Australia's legal system derives from two sources. 
From the British heritage the political and legal 
thought of Jeremy Bentham and John Austin predominates, 
built on a foundation of the Hobbesian notion of 
91 Lionel Bowen: Hansard, 30 April 1987, 2314. 
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sovereign indivisible power vested in the Monarchy, and 
the necessary supremacy of statute over common law. 
Bentham was deeply preoccupied with legislation for 
reform purposes, setting up the principle of 'utility' as 
the criterion by which the success of government and its 
laws must be measured. he sought reasonable, practical 
solutions to social problems, did not favour any 
limitations on sovereign power which could operate to 
interfere with legislation for the purposes of reform. 
he was influential in bringing about the death in England 
of any notions of an a priori, normative, supra-
legislative principle supporting concepts of 'natural 
rights'. In the outcome, constitutional limitations do 
not fetter the British Parliament, and the only practical 
limitation on its power is political. Protection of 
individual rights is dependent on voluntary adherence to 
common law principles and to the rule of law. 
John Austin based his first concepts of analytical 
jurisprudence on Bentham's political theories of 
unrestrained parliamentary sovereignty, promulgating the 
legal positivist view that the judge is concerned with 
legality alone, and his role is to enforce the law of the 
land92 . 
This was the legal tradition behind the Founding 
Fathers when they met to hew out a written constitution 
92 Moffat, R C L. "Philosophical 
the Australian Constitutional Tradition" 
I.aw Reyj ew 5 9, generally. 
Foundations of 
(1965) 5 Sydney 
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for Australia. However, because they were dealing with a 
federation, they looked to the United States for a 
federal model, and so came under the influence of a very 
different tradition. 
In the united States, with its history of 
revolution, there was a deep distrust of centralised 
power and a belief in utilising Lockian concepts of 
natural rights, including that justifying revolution. 
These natural rights were specifically protected in the 
first ten amendments to the Constitution and are commonly 
known as the Bill of Rights. In order to avoid both a 
too powerful central government and an equally 
mistrusted, unlimited democratic power, the Constitution 
was designed to incorporate an intricate system of checks 
and balances to ensure an effective separation of power. 
American federalism resulted in the supremacy of the 
constitution rather than of parliament, while judicial 
review was rendered much more potent as an active 
'legislating' force by the separation of powers and the 
existence of the Bill of Rights, 
At the turn of the century in Australia it is clear 
from the preceding Federation debates that national 
government was possible only on a federal basis due to 
the fears of the small and remote states of losing their 
identity. Indeed, at the time of the First convention 
Tasmania and south Australia came prepared with an 
accumulation of documents describing, analysing and 
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discussing federal systems9 3 . The final result was a 
hybrid Constitution combining concepts of Cabinet 
government and ministerial responsibility with separation 
of powers, judicial review (by implication} and a Senate, 
allowing the operation of a system of checks and 
balances. Though some civil rights received limited 
protection (trial by jury, section 80; freedom of 
religion from state (legislative) interference, section 
116; freedom from discriminatory treatment as between 
residents of different states, section 117; freedom from 
acquisition of property otherwise than on just terms, 
placitum 51(xxxi)), there were no entrenched natural 
rights to compare with the potency of the united States 
Bill of Rights. This absence of protection of rights was 
attributed by Sir Owen Dixon to confidence in 'the wisdom 
and safety of entrusting to the chosen representatives of 
the people sitting either in the Federal parliament or 
the State Parliaments all legislative power, 
substantially without fetter or restriction• 94 • 
Against this background the package of organised 
crime legislation must be assessed, and it cannot be 
denied that it leans heavily towards the Benthamite 
notion that a sovereign government may enact any 
legislative measures it considers appropriate to achieve 
the ends of social reform which it has in view. When 
93 La Nauze, J A. "The Making of the Australian 
Constitution" Melb. U,P. 1972 25-26. 
94 In "Jesting Pilate and other Papers and 
Addresses•, 102. 
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tested by Bentham's felifici calculus to assess its 
degree of utility, many would consider that the over-all 
benefit of the package outweigh the ill-effects, 
The advantages would include the facilitation of 
the investigation and prosecution of organised crime, 
restoration to the community of the millions of dollars 
it has been deprived of in lost revenue, and the 
rendering of the criminal activity so difficult, 
dangerous and unprofitable that, by its dwindling away, 
the costly social ills (drug addiction, health costs, 
public corruption) which accompany it would also be 
curbed. 
Against this good is set the loss of some degree of 
privacy, and the compromising of some long-standing 
common law principles of criminal responsibility, 
criminal procedure and sentencing, examples of virtually 
all of which could be found represented in existing 
legislation, 
Section 243B of the Customs Act permits pecuniary 
penalty orders which may exceed by far the net profit 
obtained from the criminal enterprise, which may be 
payable whether or not the person is convicted of a 
relevant of fence and which operate independently of any 
sentence or conviction. The High Court has upheld as 
constitutionally valid the overt use of punitive civil 
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sanctions in addition to any penalty or conviction95. 
Reversed onus of proof provisions exist in a number of 
Acts creating offences 96 • Strict and vicarious liability 
offences exist, though not in respect of offences 
carrying the possibility of such high fines and terms of 
imprisonment. The question is, how do the often 
intangible and speculative benefits to the diffused and 
anonymous community balance against the tangible harm to 
a relatively few individuals. 
In the context of organised crime, instead of 
receiving protection through clearly defined, specific 
offences, a subjective fault element, investigatory 
procedures hedged with traditional safeguards, onus of 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt always on the 
prosecution, now the individual is often dependent upon 
an exercise of discretion by the person in whom the power 
is vested for fair and just treatment in his or her 
particular circumstances. Avenues of review or appeal 
available are on the lawfulness, not the merits, of that 
exercise. 
Australia's ideological climate has changed to a 
large extent since the 70s in relation to intrusive 
powers of investigation, reduction of established levels 
of privacy for financial transactions and tax offences. 
95 
477, 485) 
96 
Act 1988. 
Re Smithers: Ex parte McMillan (1982) 152 CLR 
eg Trade Practices Act 1965, Ozone Protection 
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Until the Costigan Royal Commission exposed the 
extent and blatancy of the bottom-of-the-harbour schemes, 
and Costigan and Meagher undertook their campaign to 
convince the public and the government that organised 
crime, including tax fraud, was tolerated at a cost the 
community could not afford, Australians tended to 
disbelieve in a local organised crime industry, 
Also, as Freiberg97 says: 
the period from 1974 to 1980 in the High Court was 
marked by the ascendancy of a legal formalism informed by 
an intellectual hostility directed against the revenue 
authorities and whose epitome is found in the taxation 
judgments of the then Chief Justice, Sir Garfield 
Barwick. The period in question was also a time of high 
inflation, of an increasing resistance to what were 
perceived as the iniquitous rates of taxation and poor 
relations between the Commissioner of Taxation and his 
clients. 
Parliament took steps to obstruct the court's 
tendency to interpret provisions legalistically to defeat 
the purpose of tax legislation by inserting section 15AA 
in the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 requiring that 
legislation be interpreted to give effect to its purpose, 
and gradually the public came to admire large scale tax 
evaders less and resent them more as the link between 
97 Freiberg, A. "Ripples from 
Harbour: Some social Ramifications of 
(1988) 12 Criminal I.aw Journal 136, 
the Bottom of the 
Taxation Fraud" 
139. 
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J S Albanese 98 , writing on the effect of ideology 
on criminal justice policy, drew attention to the 
necessity for that degree of public support for the 
proposed control measures which would outweigh the 
opposition from civil libertarians. He quoted former 
United States Attorney-General, who said: 
We have yet to exploit properly our most 
powerful asset in the battle against the 
rackets: an aroused, informed and insistent 
public. 
The result would be laws permitting wire-tapping by 
federal law enforcement agencies and a provision enabling 
suspects to testify to incriminating activities through 
the use of immunity finally achieved when civil liberties 
objections were overcome in the Omnibus Crime Control Act 
of 1968. 
In Australia, although there was general public 
resistance to the introduction of a national system of 
identification, there has been minimal public opposition 
to the measures specifically directed against organised 
crime and major fraud. 
98 Albanese, J S. "What Lockheed and La Cosa 
Nostra Have in Common: The Effect of Ideology on 
Criminal Justice Policy" Crime and Delinq11ency April 
1982, 211, 229. 
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IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS 
Whether the firing of public imagination and 
indignation as a means of gaining support for stringent 
control measures is always productive has been 
questioned. 
By linking drugs to organised crime in the public 
mind, policy makers have been able to justify significant 
increases in power and resources in combating organised 
crime, but in the process they may have been locked into 
an approach which over-criminalises drug use and 
generates unintended negative consequences. 
The criminalisation of drug use is associated with 
income generating crime, crimes of violence associated 
with drug transactions, corruption, contravention of 
financial and currency laws and tax evasion, themselves 
with consequences leading to a range of derivative 
problems within the criminal justice system; and, as 
Miller says, ideological assumptions, 'once 
established .•• become relatively impervious to change, 
since they serve to receive or reject new evidence in 
terms of a self-contained and self-reinforcing system• 99 
Civil libertarians would argue that the present 
commonwealth commitment to large-scale amassing of 
private information about the financial transactions of 
99 Miller, W. "Ideology and criminal justice 
Policy" (1973) Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 
142, 142. 
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generally innocent citizens, the sharing of such 
information between agencies, sometimes for purposes 
which are unrelated to the purpose for which the 
collection of the information was authorised under the 
Constitution (for example, provision of information to 
state or international agencies), and the sacrifice of 
long-standing criminal law principles, are negatives 
which change the nature of our society for the worse in 
ways which cannot be justified by any hypothetical 
decrease in the hospitality of the Australian environment 
to organised crime. 
In Fisse's view: 
The so-called war against organised crime has 
generated a new despotism in criminal 
legislation, a new despotism wherein serious 
offences are described in such scattershot 
terms that the scope of liability depends very 
little on law and very much on an 
administrative discretion, 
This despotism is not only ethically 
indefensible, but has gone to the extent of 
exposing lawyers and acountants, stockbrokers 
and financial institutions to unwarrnated risk 
of pro7ecutio~ in105eir everyday pro1essional or business lives 
Pragmatists, on the other hand, take the view that, 
on the basis of the findings of the Royal Commissions and 
Inquiries that exposed the scale of organised crime and 
revenue fraud in Australia, rigorous measures were 
urgently required and justified, and that sufficient 
safeguards can be incorporated to protect the innocent 
100 Fisse, B. Draconian Overreach in Organised 
Crime Control: The Real dirt in Money-Laundering" 
(1987) 25 Law Society .Journal of New south Wales 60 
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from suffering any ill-effects; indeed, they may be said 
to benefit by receiving relief from the $11 to $87 per 
week per tax-payer which, in 1987, was offered as a 
conservative estimate of the cost of organised fraud101. 
In contrast, for the year 1988-1989 the National Crime 
Authority Annual Report reported total tax assessments of 
$23,971,435 and total proceeds of crime of $5,501,000, 
this being a period during which the legislation had 
hardly begun to have an impact, 
The values involved in this debate are deep and 
personal and will never be completely resolved one way or 
the other. A balancing process, in which the pendulum 
swings one way and then the other, keeping the values and 
principles cherished on each side within an acceptable 
range may be the only solution. The process has been 
well expressed by Lord Cooper in Lawrie v Ml.U.I:l02 
From the standpoint of principle it seems to me 
that the law must strive to reconcile two 
highly important interests which are liable to 
come into conflict - (al the interest of the 
citizen to be protected from illegal or 
irregular invasions of his liberties by the 
authorities, and (b) the interest of the State 
to secure that evidence bearing upon the 
commission of crime and necessary to enable 
justice to be done shall not be withheld from 
the courts of law on any merely formal or 
technical ground. Neither of these objects can 
be insisted upon to the utmost. The protection 
of the citizen is primarily the protection of 
101 Griffin, T and Rowe, B. •Problems of 
Prosecuting Corporate Crime: Soundings from the Bottom 
of the Harbour" (1987) 74 Proceedings of the Institute of 
Criminology SU Law School 11, 11, 
102 [1950] SLT 37, 39-40. 
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the innocent citizen against unwarranted, 
wrongful and perhaps high-handed interference, 
and the common sanction is an action of 
damages. The protection is not intended as a 
protection for the guilty citizen against the 
efforts of the public prosecutor to vindicate 
the law. On the other hand, the interest of 
the State cannot be magnified to the point of 
causing all the safeguards for the protection 
of the citizen to vanish, and of offering 
positive inducement to the authorities to 
proceed by irregular methods 
In light of the fact that Australia is a federation 
in an international context where rapid, virtually 
instantaneous, communications and speed and ease of 
travel mean that countries can no longer act, in many 
areas, in isolation from one another, the role of the 
Commonwealth is increasingly to respond ·at a national 
level to challenges which affect the international 
community, and organised crime is certainly one of these 
challenges. 
Where in such instances the Commonwealth lacks the 
constitutional power to legislate on a particular subject 
matter it must use what power it has creatively, 
exploring the extent of its powers under sections 
51(xxixl and 51lxxxix) of the Constitution, (the external 
affairs power and the incidental power), developing its 
co-ordinating role where an exercise in co-operative 
federalism is the only feasible response, and testing the 
limits of the indirect powers authorised by the High 
Court in the Herald & Weekly Times 103and Murphyores 
cases. 
103 (19661 115 CLR 418. 
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In the Australian system so many checks and 
balances, in the form of the Senate, virtually never 
controlled by the government, quite powerful committees, 
the States themselves, and the electorate, operate to 
limit any naked exercise of power by the executive that a 
considerable degree of consensus is required to achieve 
the successful passage of controversial legislation, 
In spite of considerable criticism on civil 
liberties grounds of some aspects of the Commonwealth's 
organised crime legislation, it would appear that many 
people agree to some extent with Lord Cooper that 
ultimately, in reconciling the interests which come into 
conflict in the course of curtailing the activities of 
sophisticated, organised and well-resourced criminals, 
the safeguards for the protection of the citizen are not 
intended as protection for the guilty citizen against the 
efforts of the public prosecutor to vindicate the law, 
-----------------------
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